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Abstract
We examine a number of personnel practices, laws and regulations that lower the supply of labor in the
Japanese economy.  Broadly speaking, there are two kinds of impediments, those that restrict the
movement of labor between firms, and those that discourage women from participating to a greater
extent.  Using other OECD countries and especially the United States as a benchmark, we estimate that
removal of these barriers would increase the productive labor supply in Japan by some 13 to 18 percent
and thus could raise the potential growth rate of the Japanese economy by roughly 1% per annum over
a ten-year period.
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1.  Introduction
Japanese labor market institutions, especially the personnel management system have been
given a fair share of the credit for Japan’s enviable growth performance after the Second
World War.  The stable employment system with strong job protection, enterprise-based
unionism and intensive on-the-job training (OJT) that promoted greater productivity are seen
as one of the factors that allowed Japan to import foreign technology from other advanced
countries so rapidly.  High levels of training along with group-oriented activities have also
been linked to the high quality of the Japanese goods that reached export markets in the 1970s
and 1980s.  Indeed many Japanese workplace practices such as quality-control circles have
been adopted to good effect in the United States and Europe.  On the macroeconomic side, the
coordinated but decentralized bargaining system is seen as providing for the wage flexibility
that allowed Japan to adjust to supply shocks such as the two oil crises more rapidly than
most other OECD economies.  Finally, the egalitarian nature of the compensation system has
also been credited with providing widespread prosperity that underlies the domestic demand
for the products of the workplace.
The prolonged slowdown of the 1990s has led many economists to question whether the
institutions that were appropriate for the past are as wholesome for the health of the
contemporary economy.  The aging of the workforce makes it difficult to maintain a system
where rewards are delayed and provided through promotion rather than cash compensation.
The poor development of the external labor market has also impeded the movement of
experienced and knowledgeable employees to companies where they might be more valuable.
The rise in the unemployment rate since 1998 from around 3% to almost 6% has also changed
views about the macroeconomic role played by the labor market.  The coordinated bargaining
system under conditions of weak demand now makes it difficult for employees to increase
their incomes and thereby may reduce domestic demand. Wage restraint is also contributing
to the deflation that is currently making difficulties for the effective use of monetary policy to
revive economic growth.  Strong job protection makes it difficult for companies to restructure
their activities effectively in response to the changing external environment.  The difficulty
and cost of firing workers means that struggling companies are less likely to improve their
balance sheets.  The government, lacking confidence in the external labor market to absorb
the unemployed may have been reluctant to push for more drastic resolution of the bad debt
problem that hampers the financial system.
In this paper we more narrowly address impediments to growth on the labor supply side that
are affecting the market.  The first of these are the barriers to inter-firm mobility for Japanese
career employees, especially older men. A second impediment is the difficulty that Japanese
women face in developing meaningful careers after taking time off for raising young children.
This depresses the labor force participation of women, especially the middle-aged who have
high educational attainment.  Both of these issues are closely tied to the Japanese personnel
management system and the legal framework that supports it.  A final impediment to growth
on the labor supply side is the reluctance to accept large numbers of immigrants to Japan.
The population faces certain decline over the next fifty years without immigration and this
serves to lower expectations of growth in GDP and investment demand, although the
implications for GNP may be less certain (Dekle, 2000).  We do not analyze the reluctance to
accept immigrants in this paper, but take it as a given.  Although the situation may change in
the future, the outlook for the short-medium run is that Japan will continue with its existing
policies.  One other aspect of labor supply that we do not address in this paper is the way in
which the unemployment benefit system may induce individuals to remain unemployed.  We
also do not examine the way in which retirement benefits in Japan may encourage earlier
retirement.  The reason for this (other than shortage of space) is that with respect to the2
unemployment rate and the rates of participation of those over the age of 60, Japan is doing as
well, if not better at using potential labor resources than other countries in the OECD.
In the next section of the paper we provide a brief outline of the state of Japanese labor in the
year 2001, focusing on the extent to which institutions long seen as characteristic of the
Japanese labor market have been changing.  Section 3 then looks at the impediments to
mobility of career employees (primarily men) in Japan that may be affecting growth.  Section
4 examines the reasons why female labor force participation may be lower than the levels
seen in the United States.  Section 5 attempts to give a quantitative perspective to the
problems examined in Sections 3 and 4 and this is followed by a concluding section.
2.  The Japanese employment system in 2000
Japanese labor markets and institutions have been affected by the slump in growth of the
1990s, but many of the main features remain intact.  Widely noted aspects of the “Japanese
Model” such as enterprise-based unionism, low inter-firm mobility, low unemployment,
compensation within gender groups that is highly determined by age and seniority, large
gender gaps in pay and promotions and widespread use of mandatory retirement systems have
not dissolved in the face of the slowdown, despite press reports.  Evidence that the system has
only seen minor change includes the following:
1.  Unions remain enterprise based although union density has fallen steadily from
around 35% at the time of the first oil shock to 21% today.
2.  Job tenure for full-time regular employees remains high (Chuma, 1997) and may even
be increasing for some age groups.
3.  Inter-firm mobility rates remain virtually unchanged (Rebick, 2000) although the
number of employees forced to move because of bankruptcies has risen since the
Asian economic crisis of 1998.
4.  The unemployment rate, while high by Japanese standards remains lower than the
OECD average (5.4% and 6.9% respectively in November 2001, OECD standardized
rates).
5.  Although performance- and results-related pay are becoming more important
components of the compensation arrangements in Japanese firms, there is still a close
relationship between age (and to a lesser extent seniority) and pay.  Japanese age-
wage profiles are steep mainly because blue-collar workers as well as white-collar
workers see large increases in pay with age and seniority.  With the exception of the
managerial class of employees (see below),  the variance of pay within different age
groups remains stable (Genda and Rebick, 2000).  All of this is testimony to the
continuing presence of enterprise unions and the influence of the large, unionized
firms on wage-setting practices outside the organized sector.
6.  The gender pay gap has narrowed for full-time employees (especially the young), but
the gap in hourly pay between part-time female workers and male full-time
employees remains large.  Since some 40% of women work part-time, the overall
gender gap remains large and gender remains the single most important determinant
of earnings (Tachibanaki 1998).  Tachibanaki (1998) in a survey of eight OECD
countries including Korea finds that only in Japan is gender, rather than occupation,
age, or industry the single most important determinant of wages.
7.  Japan has relatively few women in senior management or director positions compared
with the US or UK.
Despite these observations, there are a number of ways in which the Japanese labor market is
changing, and some of these changes may gradually change our view of the “Japanese
model”. Furthermore, most of these changes appear to be permanent, rather than temporary
accommodations to economic conditions or the need for restructuring.3
1.  The proportion of individuals working as part-time or contract workers is increasing.
In particular the percentage of employees working part-time has been rising steadily
since the 1960s, reaching highs of 39% of women and 13% of men in 1999 (OECD,
2001).  The number of temporary agency workers remains low at about 1% of the
workforce, but has been increasing rapidly with liberalization of the laws regulating
agency work.
2.  There has been a decline in the family-based enterprise sector.  Some of the women
who in the past would have been family workers, or men who in the past would have
become self-employed after mandatory retirement are now part of the part-time
employee labor force.  Although some of this trend may be due to small businesses
suffering during the 1990s, much of it is due to fundamental restructuring of the
Japanese economy that is taking place.
3.  Managerial compensation is becoming much more sensitive to various measures of
performance than in the past.  This is not only shown by surveys across companies
but also by the fact that the variance of pay of middle-aged men with higher
education degrees has been increasing over the past 15 years (Genda and Rebick).
4.  Attitudes are changing, especially among young people.  Although the rates of
separation for young workers have not increased that much, most young employees
say that they expect to change jobs in the future before mandatory retirement. Young
workers are actually quitting their jobs at an increasing rate despite the poor state of
the economy. In 1999, 32 % of university graduates, and 47 percent of high-school
graduates quit their first jobs within three years, an increase since 1996 (MOL 1999).
5.  In a related development, there is an increasing level of part-time work among the
young.  These workers, often referred to as freeters may be finding it difficult to find
desirable full-time jobs in the current economic climate (Genda, 2001).  They may
also feel less pressured into taking jobs that they don’t really want because of greater
affluence.
3.  Barriers to mobility between firms in Japan:
There are many barriers to mobility in the Japanese labor market including the difficulties
companies have in firing workers and problems workers have in finding jobs to move to.
Table 1 gives some evidence from a survey by Recruit of individuals who would like to
change jobs but are finding it difficult to do so.
TABLE 1  Principal reasons why workers who want to change jobs are unable to do so
Reasons %
I exceed the age limit of the job postings 40.8
My work experience is not transferable to the general society 23.4
Returns to seniority will be lost and I will suffer wage loss 21.8
I do not know how to look for jobs 19.1
I will lose personal contacts established through my work 14.1
I will suffer loss in pensions 13.5
[SOURCE:  Recruit 2000]
This list only gives a one-sided view of the problems in the labor market, however, as there
are additional problems on the employer side and we begin with one of these.
a) Worker protection
The most obvious problem facing companies burdened with redundant workers is the
difficulty in firing workers.  There is a long-standing agreement between management and
labor in Japan that allows management to move workers around in the company (or even to
loan workers to other companies) in return for the guarantee of employment until the age of4
mandatory retirement (Gordon, 1985,1998) This guarantee has recently been altered in the
sense that employees may be sent out to other companies prior to mandatory retirement
provided that the guarantee of employment still holds.  The original company in this case will
in most cases supplement the salary of the employee to make sure that there are no financial
losses to the employee from the move (Rebick, 1993).  Although this is seen as a commitment
by management to labor, which might be upheld in order to maintain the reputation of the
employer (and industrial peace),  it is also backed up by Japanese case law.
1  Japanese labor
law does not, in itself,  provide guarantees to employees, except that employers must give 30
days notice of dismissals.  The Japanese constitution, however, enshrines the individuals right
to work (article 27) and the right to a minimum standard of “wholesome and cultured living”
(article 25).  On this basis, Japanese courts have interpreted the law to impose four main
standards on employers that want to fire workers (Chuma, 1998). The burden is on employers
to show that:
(1) the firm is under severe duress such as facing possible bankruptcy and
redundancies are unavoidable
(2) they have made efforts to avoid redundancies by taking measures such as cutting
overtime, hiring freezes, transfers, seconding workers to other companies or
seeking voluntary retirements
(3) they have consulted with the labor unions and employees
(4) they have a rational selection procedure for selecting those who are to be fired
Historically, this case law developed in the 1950s in reaction to the widespread dismissals that
followed implementation of the disinflationary Dodge Line and the numerous industrial
disputes that followed.  The courts were concerned about dismissals being used as a way of
undermining labor union strength by management, and the four conditions were aimed
primarily at preventing this kind of unfair labor practice in accordance with the newly
established labor law.  In addition to these conditions the courts have also established that the
redress for violation of these principles is not only that the fired worker must be compensated,
but also that the worker must be reinstated with back pay.  This again was to act as a deterrent
to unfair labor practices.  The late 1970s was a period when the effect of this legislation was
tested and Chuma points out that in 1975 at the peak of dismissals, the proportion of
separations that were “at the employer’s will” stood only at 10% compared with 21% in 1954
and in general, firms took every action to avoid dismissals through the late 1970s.  In the
1970s and after, the protection of workers from dismissals was extended also to temporary or
fixed-contract workers who had been repeatedly rehired after their contract expired.
Although arguments can be made for worker protection from the viewpoint of economic
efficiency, there is little rationale for imposing a penalty whereby workers must be reinstated
with back pay.  Chuma (1998) argues that it would be better to simply impose a cash penalty
that employers should pay workers who have been dismissed in violation of the conditions
above. He also recognizes that courts may not be in the best position to evaluate the financial
concerns of the company and that if condition (1) is imposed too stringently it may
compromise the survival of the firm over the long run.
2  Yashiro (1999) also points out that
there are negative externalities arising from this legal principle in the labor market.  We deal
with one of the most serious of these in section (e) below: the lack of a well-developed
external labor market and the information problems that result.  One other effect that such a
legal principle has is that it encourages companies to seek government help in the form of
subsidies, protection from competition, and protection from creditors.  Although the labor
case law was not responsible for this action, it is part of a general approach that provides
                                                
1 The remainder of this section leans heavily on Chuma (1998).
2 Since 1999 there have been a number of court rulings that have relaxed and even in one or two cases
dispensed with the framework of the four conditions, but it is still too early to know what overall effect
these rulings will have (Yamakawa and Araki, 2001).5
economic security through employers rather than directly from the state or private insurance
provision (Noguchi 1995).  This may come at the expense of growth in total factor
productivity.  For example, Hayashi and Prescott (2001) note that TFP growth was
exceptionally low at 0.8% per annum during the period of 1978-1983 when the Japanese
government took action to subsidize and otherwise support industries that were in need of
restructuring and firms endeavored to avoid dismissals.
b)  The importance of seniority in the pay structure
The second barrier to mobility that we examine is the existence of the tenure effect on
earnings in the Japanese workplace.  The work of Koike (1988), Hashimoto and Raisian
(1985) and Mincer and Higuchi (1988) drew attention to the importance of on-the-job training
and the development of firm-specific human capital for Japanese men.  Along with the case
studies and direct surveys of Koike, the latter two papers highlighted the apparently large
increase in earnings with tenure (seniority) in Japan compared with the United States.  More
recent work by Ohtake (1998) and others using cross-section microdata have modified this
view substantially.  First, Ohtake finds that the return to tenure was smaller than had earlier
been reported, even in the past.  Second, he shows that the returns to tenure fell between 1980
and 1992 (while they rose in the United States).  As a result, the cross-sectional data suggest
that the increase in earnings attributable to tenure is 1-2% per year in Japan, still somewhat
higher than in the US.  This is mainly, but not entirely due to the fact that seniority has a
much larger effect on the earnings of Japanese blue-collar workers than their American
counterparts.  Japanese tenure is higher than that of most other OECD countries for all age
categories, Italy being a notable exception.  As a result, middle-aged Japanese employees
stand to lose more by leaving their firm than their counterparts in most other countries.  This
is particularly important for the higher paid employees of large Japanese firms who have
almost double the median tenure of those in smaller firms (Ohtake, 1998,Table 4.7)
The work of Ohtake (1998) suggests that the loss in earnings of a male employee with 30
years of tenure would be approximately 30% of his earnings.
3  This estimate is based on
cross-sectional comparisons between different workers with different work histories, but it is
not inconsistent with anecdotal evidence and the evidence from other government surveys.
This should not be confused with the loss in the value of specific capital, however.  If the
technologies involved become obsolete or if the product can no longer be produced
competitively by the firm then the human capital may already have lost its value whatever the
firm is paying the employee.  The benefits of worker protection may be quickly outweighed
by the costs when there is a widespread drop in the value of some kinds of firm-specific
human-capital.
The losses in earnings experienced by workers who leave firms after many years have an
effect on mobility because they will increase resistance to the employer from unions or
workers who know that they have the support of the legal system.  Although there may well
be an explanation in terms of firm-specific human capital to support the high returns to tenure
in Japan, there are other views of this pattern that suggest that it may be a compensation
policy developed in the past both to motivate workers and to provide for basic needs.  In this
view, the returns to seniority can be reduced through managerial reform without having any
adverse effect on productivity, if pay-for-performance systems are introduced.  This seems to
be what is taking place in Japan, albeit at a slow pace (Rebick, 2001).  If the returns to
                                                
3 I calculate this by taking the values of 40% earnings growth due to tenure computed by Ohtake
(1998) in Tables 4.10 and 4.11 for an individual with 30 years tenure.  This means that a worker with
no tenure but the 30 years experience would have around 70% of the earnings of someone with 30
years tenure.6
seniority were further reduced, this should naturally raise the rate of mobility and also lessen
the motivation of the courts to maintain such high standards of legal protection.
4
c) Lack of portability of firm-based pensions  Closely related to the problem of seniority-
based pay is the lack of portability of private, firm-based pensions in the Japanese system.
Japan has only recently implemented the equivalent of the US 401k type of defined-
contribution plans in October 2001.  Prior to this, there were no tax advantages to saving
outside of the defined-benefit plans offered by Japanese firms.  Japanese firm-based pensions
take a number of different forms and can make lump-sum payments or provide annuities after
retirement, but they share the characteristics of offering benefits based on years of service and
final base salary.  The recipient with 35 years tenure typically gets two to four years of base
pay (not including the semi-annual bonus) with the higher rates going to the better-educated
employees of large firms (MOL, 2000b).  The problem with portability arises because the
payouts are often reduced more than proportionately if the employee leaves before the age of
mandatory retirement.  At the same time, individuals with low tenure at the age of mandatory
retirement (due to switching firms) may also suffer from a more than proportional reduction
in their benefit.  The likely losses in earnings from a move will also lead to additional losses
in pensions.
Ichinose (2001) uses pension tables to compute the pension losses that would be experienced
by individuals who leave a large firm with more than 1000 employees and move to a smaller
firm at lower pay (the most common pattern).  The losses are computed assuming that the
individual is paid the average for the firm size and according to tenure.  Pension losses can
amount to between 10-20 million yen from an average pension of 35 million yen, depending
on the age of separation.  The younger the age of separation, the greater the loss.  For this
reason, firms, especially large firms offer additional lump-sum payments to individuals who
leave under early retirement plans.  The additional lump-sum payments amounting to between
5 and 10 million yen cover some, but not all of the losses in pension value.  In comparison
with the overall losses of up to 100 million yen that may be realized by workers who lose
their jobs at large firms at age 40, these are not large quantities, but as suggested by the last
response in Table 1, have some influence on behavior.
d) Firm-size differentials, egalitarian pay norms and mobility
One important stylized fact about mobility in Japan is that employees tend to move to smaller
firms.  If we restrict ourselves to looking at employees who have switched firms in 1997,
there were a total of 1,670,000 separations and (by definition) the same number of accessions
(Employment Trends Survey, 1998, Table 10).  If we restrict our attention to large firms with
more than 1000 employees, however, there were 192,000 separations involving inter-firm
moves, but only 172,000 accessions.  The main source of this “mobility deficit” for large
firms is found in the age groups of those who are 50 and over.
One reason why we observe this tendency is that there is a preference for egalitarian pay
systems in Japan. Baron (1988) emphasizes the role of peer groups and normative
comparisons in shaping workers’ assessments of fairness, and explains that workers’
perceptions of fairness concerning output and rewards are governed more by social
comparison when there is greater homogeneity among workers.  He explains that workforce
homogeneity “facilitates identification with peers and co-workers,…  and that such
homogeneity (is noted to be) greater in Japanese than U.S. facilities” (p.516).  Under a system
where wages and promotion are determined primarily by age and seniority, careful measures
are taken to ensure that workers are promoted in accordance with seniority, and that
                                                
4 Some of the arguments used by the courts have made reference to the need for worker protection
given the nature of the Japanese employment system, including the pay accorded to seniority (Chuma,
1998).7
deviations from the main career track are minimized.  Empirically, Japan-U.S. comparisons
have consistently shown that the variance in wages among Japanese organizations are smaller
than their US counterparts (see for example, Kalleberg and Lincoln 1988).  More
interestingly, Ishida, Su, and Spilerman (2000) examine promotion differences between a
Japanese and US company and find that promotion in the US firm occurs immediately after
firm-entry, but promotion in the Japanese company was non-existent for the first twelve
years.  In other words, there was no differentiation in rank as if all workers were treated alike
for the first twelve years.  Hence, bringing in older workers into the workforce disrupts the
seniority structure, and hence the wage structure, because the employment system presumes
entry from below.
This is one of the factors why the introduction of pay-for-performance systems that really
deliver high variance in outcomes has been so slow.  The preference for egalitarian pay in the
presence of pay systems where there is strong age-consciousness means that firms often feel
that it is necessary to pay mid-career hires as if they had similar seniority to those of the same
age in the firm.  For example, a recent survey of 13,000 establishments by the government
(MOL, 2000a) indicates that in the majority of firms surveyed, new employees are in
principle paid the same approximate level of pay as existing employees of the same age and
occupation.  Only 15% indicated that they would pay these hires less than their age cohort,
presumably because they lacked the firm-specific experience.  Smaller firms in Japan pay
substantially lower wages, even after differences in worker attributes are taken into account
(Tachibanaki and Ohta 1994, Rebick, 1992).  For this reason it is more likely that a worker
moving between firms will be able to find work in a smaller firm, which is able to pay him
less, given the loss in firm-specific skill.  Of course, exceptionally able or skilled employees
will be able to stay in the large firm sector or move up to larger firms, but on average,
employees will tend to move down the firm-size hierarchy.
The reasons for the firm-size differentials are not completely understood (Tachibanaki and
Ohta, 1994) but it is unlikely that the underlying causes, many of which are rooted in Japan’s
industrial organization will change over the short- or medium- term.  What we wish to
emphasize here is that it is the combination of seniority/age related pay, preference for
egalitarian pay for similar age groups, and the firm-size differential that distort the pattern of
inter-firm mobility in Japan.  In particular, this means that the kinds of jobs that are available
to older men in Japan will be severely restricted.  This in turn makes it more difficult for
larger firms to dismiss their employees.
(e) Information problems
A long-standing problem in the Japanese labor market concerns the lack of
employment information available.  Commonly,  workers do not know exactly (in terms of
quality as well as quantity) what skills they have, and employers are unclear about the skills
they need.  Hence it is not only a problem of asymmetric information which afflicts this
market.  A major problem in Japan has been the symmetric lack of information, and this is
almost certainly due to the poor development of the external labor market in an economy with
overall low mobility.  “Better information for job seekers” has been a recurrent slogan from
job seekers in a situation where job postings tend to be ambiguous and crucial information
such as job description and required skills are lacking (JIL 1998).
Employment information can be categorized into extensive information which
consists of information available to all job-seekers such as firm size and wages, and intensive
information which is more likely to be insider-information in nature, such as the work norms
or work atmosphere of the employer (Rees 1966).  Access to intensive information is a
benefit insofar as it improves the quality of the job match, and subsequently leads to higher
rewards and better job satisfaction (Granovetter 1974).  Watanabe (1992) explains that
workers are more likely to obtain intensive information through acquaintances or former8
employers.  According to the Recruit survey, 41 percent of job seekers gathered employment
information through “contacts with friends, family and former employers,”
5 and 30 percent
(or 72 percent of job-seekers who used these contacts) found jobs through this channel.  A
labor market which favors informal job-search methods disfavors job-seekers who are not
endowed with network ties, who must seek re-employment through formal means.  Workers
who seek employment through direct applications or through employment agencies
experience considerable hardship, e.g. longer duration of job-search,  and a poor quality of
match (JIL 1998).
6
In a society where a market for job-changers is only just evolving, it is not surprising
that human resource firms that specialize in headhunting and re-employment services are
rapidly growing and this may lead to improvement in the future.  One of the top responses for
barriers to job changes in Japan is that many workers simply “do not know how to look for
jobs” (Recruit 2001).  The HR firms succeeded by focusing specifically on the information
mismatch problem between the buyers and sellers of labor.  Their services include helping
employers grasp which skills are needed, and helping job-seekers identify what types of skills
they have and the options available to them.  The potential growth of employment services
such as the ones provided by this HR firm remains promising for the foreseeable future.  The
government is also gradually deregulating the market for private employment services
including temporary employment agencies through revision of the Dispatched Employees
Law.
Access to privileged information vis-à-vis social networks may not be limited to
employment information.  The quantity and quality of social resources are not only
determined by the breadth and depth of the individual’s network of acquaintances, but also by
virtue of his belonging to a particular organization.  Establishing important connections with
business partners, and gaining trust and reputation within the firm are important forms of
social resources that workers acquire through their jobs.  However, in most cases, such
resources will be lost if the worker relocates to a different establishment.  Social resources
acquired through business can be a benefit that facilitates workers’ upward mobility within
firms, but it can also be an impediment to inter-firm mobility as workers feat that they “will
lose personal contacts established through work” (Table 1).
Finally, a related problem which seems to be of increasing concern in Japan today is
that of skills mismatch in the labor market.  Nickell et al (2001) in a survey of OECD
economies report that the Beveridge curve has been shifting outward in Japan since the 1970s
and this trend has clearly accelerated in the late 1990s (Genda and Rebick, 2000).  This
implies that for any given unemployment rate there are more vacancies available, suggesting
that there may be an increasing  problem of mismatch of skills in the labor market. A joint
survey of businesses and job seekers done by METI and Recruit more clearly shows that
although the level of vacancies and applicants across 60 occupational categories was
approximately equal at 690,000 and 740,000 respectively, there were wide variations within
occupation categories with the ratio of vacancies to applicants running from 9.95 to 0.05
(METI-Recruit, 2001)  A major problem highlighted in the same study is the lack of
necessary qualifications of job applicants, especially in some of the more specialized
occupations such as IT-related work.  Although public support for re-training is offered both
to companies and to individuals and there are proposals to increase the levels of this support,
it is also clear that the flow of information must be improved so that individuals (or
outplacement departments) may improve the quality of the skill training provided in order to
resolve the mismatch problem (METI-Recruit, 2001).
                                                
5 The comparable estimate in Granovetter (1974)’s study of male white-collars in Boston was 56
percent.
6 This, of course, is not a problem peculiar to Japan.9
(f) Problems specific to middle-aged and older workers
One of the consequences of the legacy of long-term employment and the seniority
system is that Japanese firms impose age limits in their recruiting and hiring.  This problem,
specifically that the workers exceed the age limit of the jobs posted, continues to be the most
common reason for workers not changing jobs in the Japanese labor market, confirmed not
only in the Recruit survey, but also in government reports and statistics (JIL 2001c).
According to a recent report, over 90 percent of Japanese firms impose age restrictions
ranging from under the ages of 35 to 40 on their job openings with little variation across
industry, firm size and city size (JIL 2001a).  There are many reasons why firms impose age
limits, but they primarily concern how older workers do not fit into the firm’s current
employment system (Table 2).
TABLE 2  Reasons why Japanese firms impose age restrictions in recruitment
Reasons  %
Older workers lack physical endurance          33.8
Older workers require higher wages          26.9
Occupational skills of older workers do not match firm’s expectations          24.9
Desire to maintain a young workforce          23.8
To restrict number of job applicants          20.2
Older workers do not mix well with younger workers          14.9
Older workers are hard to handle          12.9
Older workers do not adapt well to corporate culture            9.9
To avoid exceeding the age structure of previous hires            8.8
Older workers lack motivation            6.7
Relative ease of hiring young workers            5.7
We have no posts for older workers and cannot accommodate them            4.8
Because other firms impose age limits            3.0
[SOURCE:  Japan Institute of Labour 2001]
These reasons make sense in light of the previous discussions.  Because of the prevailing
norm of long-term employment, there is still a stigma attached to older or mid-career job
seekers and firms often view them as “hard to handle” or as “unable to adapt well into the
corporate culture.”  It is also likely that many individuals who have lost jobs in other
companies are simply not as able, and that the new employers’ views that they don’t adapt
well may have applied equally well in their former company.  As discussed in the previous
section, the hesitation for Japanese firms to hire mid-career workers is partly rooted in the
notion of equity. Indeed, from Table 2 we can infer that the reason why Japanese firms
impose age restrictions is less because of the “relative ease of hiring young workers,” but
more because “older workers do not mix well with younger workers,” or “to avoid exceeding
the age structure of previous hires.”
Owing to recent pressures of employment reform, “guidelines” to abolish the age
limits in recruiting and hiring were introduced in October 2001 as part of the revised
Employment Measures Law.  However, the guidelines specify ten cases or exceptions where
imposing age limits are acceptable.  Most notably, one of the exceptions is phrased almost
specifically to prevent disruptions in the seniority system, and reads as follows:
(4) Cases where recruiting or hiring is intended for workers under a certain age in
situations where in order to make wage payments regardless of age to new
employees, companies will be required to revise present regulations determining
wages mainly in accordance with age. (JIL 2001c)10
As it stands, the guideline is viewed mainly as a cosmetic gesture; it simply states that
employers should make efforts to abolish age limits.  Unlike the legal sanctions that are
enforced in certain countries in violation of age discrimination legislations, the Japanese
guideline does not impose any penalty for violations.  A cursory glance at job postings after
the guideline was put into effect confirms that a majority, if not all job postings continue to
require age limits
7.  It is thus questionable whether the guideline will have any effective
results in the foreseeable future. Even if the law was imposed with greater force, the
experience of the US and other countries where older workers have greater difficulty in the
labor market suggests that the problem will not go away.  As mentioned earlier, the high
levels of tenure held by Japanese workers, especially in large companies mean that their
losses of both earnings and specific capital are likely to be present them with even greater
problems than their counterparts elsewhere.
g) Regulations concerning fixed period labor contracts
One problem with the level of job protection provided by dismissal case law has been the
reluctance of employers to take on employees that they are not sure they wish to keep
indefinitely.  Up until quite recently, the Labour Standards Law only allowed fixed-term
contracts of up to one year in length
8.  After revision in 1998, the law now allows for
contracts of up to three years, but only in the case where the employee is over 60 or is in a
specialized occupation or other restricted circumstances determined by the Ministry of
Health, Labour and Welfare (hereafter MHLW).  Furthermore, such a contract is not
renewable (except for one year) (Yamakawa 1998).  This is a considerable restriction, and has
been heavily criticized (Ohtake, 2001; Yashiro 1999).
4.  Barriers to increasing women’s labor force participation
Table 3 shows women’s labor force participation rates and the rates of part-time work
for women in Japan and elsewhere in the OECD.  It is clear that Japanese women, while not
having the lowest rate of overall participation in the OECD, are far from having the highest
rate and are substantially below the US in this respect.  There is therefore room for Japan to
increase its labor inputs from this source.  Secondly, Japanese women are more likely to work
part-time (defined here as less than 35 hours per week) than most of their counterparts
elsewhere.  There are a number of reasons why this situation exists.
TABLE 3  Labor Force Participation Rates and Rates of Part-time Employment for Women,
















2 Part-time employment/all employment
Source: OECD Employment Outlook, 2001
                                                
7 See for example, job postings on Yahoo! Japan at http://employment.yahoo.co.jp/ (in Japanese).
8 This was originally intended to force employers to offer indefinite period contracts to their employees
and avoid exploitation.  It might be thought that one could still informally agree to keep workers for
more than one year by renewal, but as mentioned above, Japanese case law has extended protection
against dismissal to those employees who work for one-year contracts that have been repeatedly
renewed.11
First, women are more likely to exit the labor force for childrearing and family
responsibilities, then return to the labor force in later stages of the lifecycle.  This pattern of
exit and re-entry results in the so-called M-curve pattern of labor force participation rates
(LFPR).  The M-curve has flattened out in recent years, but as Figure 1 shows, the mass exit
of women in their thirties continues to be a pronounced pattern in international comparisons.
However, it is also the case that the proportion of women who want to work but cannot is also
highest among this age group.  When this proportion is included in the actual LFPR, we
obtain an LFPR curve which resembles that of their Western counterparts.  This LFPR curve,
known as the potential LFPR curve, has received considerable attention in policy circles that
focus on Japanese women’s requirements to reconcile work and family life.  Though
optimistic, the potential LFPR constitutes an upper bound of the number of women who could
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Figure 1  Labor force participation rates by age cohort for selected countries
[SOURCE:  International Labor Organization 1999, data for Japan taken from Ministry of Labor 1999]
Another feature concerns the growth in part-time employment.  As Figure 2 shows,
the proportion of women in regular employment has changed little since 1965.  However,
there has been a remarkable transition from the informal sector (self-employed and family
workers) to part-time employment, attributable mainly to changes in Japan’s industrial
structure – a decline in the agricultural sector employment and family-run work, and a rise in
work opportunities in firms (Nagase 1997), and a relative improvement of female wages
(Shimada and Higuchi 1985).
                                                
9 For example, Osawa (1998), citing results from the 1992 National Survey on Lifestyle Preferences,
explains that the actual LFPR will resemble the potential LFPR if the proportion of women who would













Figure 2  Composition of female labor force by work categories
* Part-time employees refer to workers with less than 35 working hours per week.
Why does the M-curve remain pronounced, and why has there not been an increase in
the proportion of women in regular employment in Japan?  As will be discussed in the
following sections, Japanese women’s working patterns are better understood by accounting
for their non-market activities.  Although expectations and attitudes concerning traditional
gender division of labor are declining, Japanese women still face pressure to remain as full-
time mothers for children under school age, and must maintain flexible work patterns to
accommodate their responsibilities.  The Japanese government is attempting to improve this
situation through measures such as the New Angel Plan that include expansion of the
provision of childcare (MHLW, 2001, 248-51).  Compounding these supply-side problems
are demand-side impediments such as the difficulty women face in being hired into the
internal labor market, and disincentives stemming from the unintended consequences in the
tax and benefit system.
(a) Exclusion from the internal labor market (ILM)
The extensive training that takes place within Japanese firms presumes a long-term
relationship between workers and employers.  Employers seek workers who plan to remain
with the firm over a long period, such that the costs of their investments will not be lost.
Because women are more likely to exit the labor force for reasons of marriage or childrearing,
they face statistical discrimination (Brinton 1989):  Employers resist hiring women into their
permanent workforce because they judge from past experience that women are more likely to
quit and that investment in women’s training is therefore riskier than investment in men’s.
Brinton argues that “the pervasiveness of the internal labor market structure and
accompanying firm-specific training constitutes an institutional barrier to women” (p.553).
Japanese women may enter large firms at equal proportions as men, but a very small
proportion of these women enter career-track positions in these firms.
High-status positions in the seniority system are awarded to workers with long-
standing tenure, but as with the problems faced by men detailed earlier, there are problems if
one changes firms or drops out of the labor market for a period.  The common route for
women is to re-enter the labor force as part-time workers.  Women who reenter the market
also tend to find employment in smaller firms.  In fact, Saso (1990) explains that older
Japanese women are much more concentrated than young women in small firms and unskilled
blue-collar occupations.  As we discuss below, better educated married women with children
are more likely to remain non-participants, other things equal.  One reason for this, beyond
the financial reasons may be that the quality of the jobs and the interest in the work available13
is not attractive to better-educated women who may prefer to develop non-market (leisure)
activities.
Using the census data for Japan and the US, Brinton and Ngo (1993) estimate the
index of sex segregation for the two countries among two occupational categories – managers
and administrators, and unskilled blue-collars.  They find that sex segregation among
managers and administrators is greater in Japan than in the US, and that sex segregation is
greater among older age groups in Japan while it remains stable across all age groups in the
US.  Among unskilled blue-collar occupations however, sex segregation is greater in the US
than in Japan, and a reverse trend is confirmed across age groups; sex segregation decreases
with age in Japan, while it increases with age in the US.  These findings are consistent with
the M-curve pattern of labor force participation among Japanese women.  The likelihood of
their placement into the internal labor market at the port of entry is lower than men’s, but
their attrition rate is even greater as large numbers of women must exit the labor force for
family duties.  When they re-enter, they do so into unskilled occupations.  This pattern of
labor mobility results in higher sex segregation among management occupations and lower
sex segregation among unskilled occupations for older workers.
(b) Government tax and benefit systems
The barrier to entry into the internal labor market, and the need to maintain flexible
work patterns to reconcile work and family life are the primary reasons for the large
proportion of Japanese women’s entry into part-time employment.  But there is also sufficient
evidence suggesting that the current structure of tax and benefit schemes distorts the labor
supply behavior of married women in part-time employment.  For example, the husband is
able to claim tax exemption for his wife’s income only up to a certain point (usually around
one million yen per year)
10.  But if the wife’s income exceeds the tax exempt limit, the after-
tax income of some households may actually decline as the wife’s income increases.
In general, such schemes were originally introduced to protect married women from the
downfall in household income for their transition from market work to household work.
However, because they rest on the implicit assumption that married women should remain as
full-time housewives, the unintended consequences of such “policies to protect full-time
housewives” (Higuchi 1995) have come under severe scrutiny amidst increasingly
diversifying patterns of women’s employment.
As a good basis for discussion, we present data from two surveys that examine how
employment patterns of married women in part-time positions are affected by various tax and
benefit schemes (Table 4).  According to these surveys, 36 percent of respondents in 1990 and
49 percent of respondents in 2001 adjusted their employment in response to these policies.
Moreover, 70 percent of the wives of salaried workers responded that they will increase their
work hours if these regulations were removed
11.  Thus, the proportion of women who
withhold their supply of labor as a consequence of such policies is not negligible.  The
following discussion focuses on three schemes – the tax exempt status for spouses, fringe
benefits provided by employers, and social security programs – and examines how they may
constitute disincentives to married women’s employment.
                                                
10 The tax exempt status and pension benefits for spouses are not gender specific, i.e. they can be
applied to husbands or wives depending on who is the dependent.  However, because a majority of the
cases concern wives, past research has been conducted under the assumption that such schemes affect
the behaviour of women more than men.  The current discussion assumes this is the case.
11 Based on the 1997 National Survey on Lifestyle Preferences, cited  in Nagase (2001).  This
proportion is reported to be 53.7 percent among the sample of married women in part-time employment
in the Non-standard Employment Survey 2001 conducted by Recruit.14
TABLE 4  Reasons for adjusting employment among married women in part-time positions
Reason








For whatever reason          35.7          49.1
I adjust my annual income to avoid paying income tax          30.0          27.8
I adjust my annual income to avoid exceeding the tax exempt
and special tax exempt status for spouses
         23.5          32.6
I adjust my annual income so that I can receive fringe benefits
provided by my spouse's employer
         12.0          15.7
I adjust my annual income so that my health insurance and
pension can be covered by my spouse
         11.5          30.5
I adjust my annual income to avoid paying unemployment
insurance
           2.0            7.5
I adjust my annual income so that my spouse's employer will
not find out that I am working
           0.8            1.4
I plan in advance so that my annual income will not exceed
one million yen
         16.2 -
I adjust my work patterns throughout the year so that my
annual income will not exceed one million yen
         13.8 -
*1 Reprinted from Higuchi (1995)
*2 Source:  Recruit Works Institute
The income tax code in Japan has undergone several revisions in the post-war period.
The 1950 revision introduced a system that placed the tax burden on individual income
instead of household income.  However, because the disposable income of households
declines according to the number of dependents, the new system also introduced exemptions
depending on the income of their spouses.  Under the latest version of this tax exemption
scheme introduced in 1988, spouse’s income was tax exempt up to an annual income of
700,000 yen, after which a 50,000 yen increase in annual income is accompanied by a 50,000
yen decrease in tax exemption, such that the exemption becomes zero at an annual income of
1.4 million yen.  The scheme is an improvement in comparison to its predecessor because it
eliminates kinks or discontinuities in the (after-tax) household budget.
But even with the revisions, income taxes at the household level are regressive within
certain ranges, and there is ample evidence that non-convexities in the household budget
distort the labor supply of women
12.  For example, Abe and Ohtake (1997) explain that the
marginal tax rate for households will be higher when the spouse’s income is between one-
million and 1.35 million yen, than when it is over 1.35 million yen.  Using the General Survey
on Part-time Workers Conditions, they examine the labor force participation rates of married
women in part-time positions as a function of their annual earnings and show that the
distribution is concentrated around the one-million yen mark, with a significant drop in
participation for earnings over one-million yen
13.  Further, they show that the distribution of
work-hours becomes a bimodal distribution when adjusted for hourly wages, with spikes
concentrated around the hours where the budget constraints are discontinuous or non-convex.
An increase in wages implies that workers reach the ceiling more quickly, so the consequence
is that workers work less hours.  Put another way, there is no incentive for married women to
increase their supply of labor under the current system (Osawa 1993).
Problematic features of the social security system have also been criticized for
causing distortions in the labor supply of women.  Under the current system, contributions to
health insurance and public pensions are exempt for spouses provided that their employment
                                                
12 See Higuchi (1995) and Osawa (1993) for theoretical discussion of the impact of tax exemption
schemes on women’s labour supply, before and after the revision of 1988.
13 Nagase (2001) shows similar results using monthly income (and not annual income).15
hours do not exceed a certain level
14, and annual income does not exceed 1.3 million yen.
Similarly, contributions to unemployment insurance are exempt for spouses whose annual
income does not exceed 900,000 yen
15.  Despite their good-intentions to ensure a sense of
equity between households with working wives versus housewives, these exemptions
discourage married women from working as they are forced to adjust their employment hours
and annual income from exceeding the critical level (Horioka 1999).  Hatta and Kimura
(1993) argue that the current pension system clearly favors households with full-time
housewives, and that the removal of such “artificial barriers” to women’s employment will
encourage more women into regular full-time employment.  The rise in regular employment
will increase the base of pension payments and subsequently alleviate the current imbalance
between payments and receipts in the pension system.
And finally, the labor supply of married women is further constrained by the fringe
benefits provided by their husband’s companies.  Higuchi (1995) reports that over eighty
percent of Japanese companies provide fringe benefits for their dependents (such as special
benefits for families and children) averaging 9,300 yen per month in 1992, but that sixty
percent of the companies will terminate these benefits if the spouse’s income exceeds a
certain level, usually around an annual income of one-million yen.  Although the amount of
the benefit may not be a substantial sum, it affects the employment of 12 to 16 percent of
married women in Japan (Table 4).
A noteworthy pattern which is observed across the three cases discussed here is that
the adjustments in labor supply are more pronounced among educated women (Abe and
Ohtake 1997, Higuchi 1995).  There are several explanations for this:  (i) Education is
positively correlated with wages, so higher-educated women reach the critical level of
earnings quicker than lower-educated women; (ii) Higher educated women have better
knowledge of the lower and upper bounds of various exemptions and respond more
sensitively; and (iii) Wives’ education is positively correlated with husbands’ education
(hence higher husbands’ earnings), such that they may have less incentive to work.  Whatever
the reasons, such an incentive structure depresses the rate of return to education for women,
and discourages the younger generation of women to pursue higher education.
In sum, there are numerous problems inherent in the current system of taxes and
benefits that discourage the labor supply of married women in Japan.  Non-convexities in the
household budget vis-à-vis regressive taxation and discontinuities in social benefits cause
married women to withhold or adjust their employment patterns in order to avoid exceeding
the ceilings imposed by these policies.  Despite the revisions undertaken in the post-war
period, further modifications are necessary in order to facilitate the diversifying patterns of
employment and work attitudes between men and women.
(d) Policies to reconcile work and family life:  Public and private initiatives
Under the Childcare Leave and Family Care Leave Law, childcare leave became
mandatory for enterprises with more than 30 employees, and family care leave became
mandatory for all enterprises.  Employees receive 25 percent of their wages while on leave.
Despite this legal system, merely 0.6 percent of male workers took childcare leave following
the birth of a child (MOL, 1997), and the situation remains that the majority, if not all
workers who take leaves are women.  In addition, some 70 percent of women do not take
maternity leaves offered by their employers and choose to quit instead, citing reasons such as
“it was not the right climate at work.”
16  Companies that have re-employment schemes, where
former employees are hired back into the same companies, now receive subsidies to facilitate
the re-employment of women.  The system is beneficial to both workers and employers
                                                
14 Employment hours per day or per week must be less than 75 percent of hours worked by regular full-
time workers, and annual income must not exceed 1.3 million yen, except for the physically challenged
and workers over the age of 60 in which cases the allowance is extended to 1.8 million yen.
15 Employment hours must not exceed 20 hours per week.
16 From the 1996 National Survey on Family Planning cited in Breslin (1997).16
insofar as it allows them to recover previous investments undertaken by the employers (Imada
1998).  However, the proportion of companies that have installed the system stands at 21
percent as of 1996, and the system is subject to numerous terms and conditions, e.g. only 14
percent of these firms will re-employ their returnees as regular employees.  As it stands, the
current system does not offer a promising alternative for women who seek re-
employment.The presence of small children dramatically reduces Japanese women’s labor
supply (Hill 1989; Nagase 1997; Ogawa and Ermisch 1996), to a degree beyond that
witnessed in Western societies
17.  However, studies have also shown that maternity leave
policies and access to childcare facilities improve women’s job continuity (with the same
employer) or re-entry into the labor force (Nakamura and Ueda 1998).  In particular, Higuchi,
Abe and Waldfogel (1997) show that childcare leave had a positive and significant effect on
married women’s job continuity in Japan, US and UK, but the marginal effect was found to
be largest in Japan.  Although the number of women who take advantage of childcare leave
may be small, the authors argue that their findings are encouraging.  They conclude that what
is required is not only for companies to install childcare policies, but to ensure a working
environment that allow workers to take advantage of such policies.
In response to growing worker demands, some Japanese companies have introduced
“family-friendly” policies, or measures that help employees reconcile the claims of work and
family life (Sato 2000).  Flexible working schedules, subsidies for costs on family care, and
installation of childcare facilities in the workplace are common forms of family-friendly
policies.  The family-friendly policy is a private initiative, but the MHLW has set up a system
of “awards for family-friendly firms” to encourage the further installation of such policies.
The need to install family-friendly policies is a high priority issue in light of the
changing values among Japanese workers.  Recent survey results  show that the proportion of
men and women who support the traditional gender division of labor is rapidly decreasing,
while the proportion of men and women who desire a balance between family and work is
increasing
18.  However, the implementation of family-friendly policies in Japanese firms
remains limited.  A Ministry of Labour survey of Japanese firms conducted in 1997 used a
point scheme to tabulate the total number of points out of 24 family-friendly schemes
installed by the employer.  The results indicate that 51 percent of Japanese firms had zero
points, i.e. more than half of the firms had no family-friendly policies apart from the legal
requirements.  The survey also finds great variation over firm size and industry with large
firms, not surprisingly, doing the most.
19
A common way for Japanese families to reconcile work and family life is to depend on their
extended family, i.e. their grandparents (Morgan and Hirosima 1983).  Empirical studies have
found that co-residence with grandparents greatly improves the probability of women’s entry
into regular employment (Nagase 1997), and increases their employment hours (Tsuya,
Bumpass, and Choe 2000).  However, it should be noted that the proportion of elderly in need
of care is also increasing, and the burden of care will likely fall on the women (Ogawa and
Ermisch 1996).  Osawa (1990) warns that “women already have difficulty reconciling their
roles as wives, mothers, and workers and now face the daunting prospect of adding nursing to
their responsibilities” (p.8).  Hence, a one-way reliance on grandparents to support women’s
worklives cannot be a long-term solution.
                                                
17 For example, Tusya, Bumpass and Choe (2000) show that the percentage of wives employed among
households with preschool age children is 37 percent in Japan versus 58 percent in the US.
18 From the 1999 NHK (Japan Broadcasting Corporation) survey, cited in Sato (2000).
19 Close to 100 percent of establishments greater than 500 employees had installed some form of
family-friendly policy averaging 11.7 points versus 44 percent and 3 points respectively among
establishments with less than 30 employees, and over 95 percent of firms in “finance and insurance”
had installed family-friendly policies averaging 7.8 points versus 40 percent and 1.5 points respectively
in the construction industry (from the 1996 Survey on Women Workers’ Employment Management,
Women’s Bureau, the Ministry of Labour, cited in Sato 2000).17
5. Estimating the extent to which Japan could raise its rate of growth through changes in the
labor market
Our approach to understanding the extent to which problems in the labor market are affecting
economic growth is based on simple growth accounting and looks at the medium term.  We
look for unutilized (or under-utilized) labor assets and assume that they can be moved into
production evenly over a given period.  This lets us know how much the potential growth of
the labor input could be altered if the impediments to the supply of this labor were removed.
The resulting figure can then be multiplied by labor’s share of national output (roughly .7 in
the Japanese case) to yield a potential increase in output to the economy.  This contribution is
a “one-time” increase to economic output, but spread over a number of years this can
represent an increase in the potential growth rate for a fixed period.  The calculation is
necessarily crude, and will depend a lot on the assumptions behind the estimates of the
amount of labor that is not being utilized.  Nevertheless, this is a useful exercise to gain some
idea of the scale of the losses experienced by the economy from labor market supply
problems.
a) We attribute losses here to i) excess labor being carried by firms that are avoiding firing
workers and  ii)factors that may be increasing the extent of mismatch in the economy and
thereby raising the natural rate of unemployment.
i) It is difficult to know the extent to which firms are carrying excess labor.  The Japanese
MHLW in its quarterly Survey of the Labour Economy (Rodo Keizai Doko Chosa) reports the
percentage of establishments surveyed that report that have surplus workers as well as the
percentage with labor shortages for different industries and occupations.  While these are
useful for understanding cyclical conditions and how they differentially impact different parts
of the labor market, they give no real sense of the size of the problem.  Japanese firms do
carry some employees on their payrolls who are nevertheless sent home for spells, often on a
rotating basis, during downturns.  There are government subsidies in some cases to encourage
firms to do this rather than fire workers (Dore, 1986)  These individuals are picked up in the
Labor Force Survey under a special category (kyugyosha) that includes all workers who are
not at work on the survey day including for illness or absenteeism.  Hashimoto (1993) notes
that the number of kyugyosha moves countercyclically and that adjustment in their numbers is
generally less important than hours and inventory adjustment in company reactions to the
business cycle.  The number of kyugyosha did rise by some 20-25% over the period 1989 to
2000, not nearly as great a response as the doubling of the number of unemployed (Statistics
Bureau, various years).  This increase in the numbers of kyugyosha since the bubble period
represents some 200,000 employees or 0.3% of total employment.  This seems like a
reasonable lower bound for the number of surplus workers in Japanese firms.
A second approach for setting an upper bound to the contribution of excess or hoarded labor
in Japan is to look at figures for total factor productivity growth and argue that slower TFP
growth is due to labor hoarding during downturns.  The 1990s were undoubtedly a period of
slower TFP growth as was the period following the first oil shock (Hayashi and Prescott,
2001).  Hayashi and Prescott (2001) calculate, after taking account of working hours, that
TFP grew at 3.7% between 1983 and 1991 and then only at the rate of 0.5% between 1991
and 2000.  If all of this drop could be attributed to excess labor being held in firms, we could
see a loss of 3.2% in the potential growth rate, assuming that this surplus labor could be
reemployed productively elsewhere.
20  This is unlikely as it would imply that almost a quarter
                                                
20 Hayashi and Prescott calculate that capital deepening actually increased during the 1990s from the
1980s, so it is unlikely that any drop in TFP growth could be attributed to a drop in the rate of
investment.18
of the labor force was surplus to firms’ needs by the end of the decade.  Nevertheless, if we
assume that if firms were able to fire workers more easily that the economy could reach the
OECD average for TFP growth per annum during 1979-1997 of 1.1%, then surplus labor kept
in firms lowers TFP growth by up to 1.1-0.5 or 0.6% per year.
21  This would also imply that
the quantity of surplus labor in Japan today would be around 5% of the employed,
comparable to the number of unemployed.
22  We take this as our upper bound for the number
of redundant workers in Japanese firms.
ii) The problem of skills mismatch and the outward shift of the Beveridge curve was
discussed earlier.  The Labour Ministry in its White Paper for 2000, uses time series of the
unemployment rate and the vacancy rate to estimate that the natural rate of unemployment has
risen from just over 2% to 3.5% since 1993 (MOL, 2000c).  This is mainly attributed to the
extent of structural change taking place in Japan, particularly the decline in manufacturing,
although ageing of the workforce is undoubtedly also part of the explanation.  Using the result
of the Labor Ministry we attribute a loss of 1.5% in overall labor input to the mismatch
problem in the labor market.
b) We attribute losses from barriers to the supply of women’s labor to two main sources:
i)Factors that induce women to restrict their hours of work to part-time work, including
restricted hours of child-care and disincentives in the tax system for married women to work
full-time. ii)Factors that induce women to be non-participants.  There are a number of factors
operating here including the need for more flexible personnel management systems that allow
women to have and rear children without losing the opportunity to have a career with
meaningful work after they return to the labor market.  In this sense, the difficulty that women
have in finding attractive job opportunities in their 30s or 40s is similar to the problems
experienced by their male counterparts.  In their case, however, it also includes factors such
as disincentives in the tax system.
i – Increasing the labor input of part-time workers
Table 3 indicates that around 40% of employed Japanese women work part-time.  As a result,
Japanese women only put in around 136 hours per month compared to men who work 165
hours per month.  If employed Japanese women all worked as many hours as the men they
would increase their labor input by 21%.  This is a grossly unrealistic expectation, but it does
serve as an upper bound for the effects of those impediments that restrict hours of work.
23  A
plausible lower bound for the effect of disincentives to working full-time starts by taking the
calculation of Higuchi (1995) who estimates that married women who constrain their hours
deliberately because of the tax and benefits system in Japan lower the overall labor input of
Japanese women by 1.4%.  For the purposes of our overall estimate of the contribution of
impediments that encourage part-time work we look at what would happen if the rate at which
women aged 25-64 in Japan worked part-time was at the U.S. level of 20% rather than 42%.
24
These women work about half as many hours as their full-time counterparts.  If half of them
were now to work full-time, this would increase the female labor input by roughly .5 x .4 x .5
or 10%.
                                                
21 In practice the effect would be smaller since the reallocated labour would lose much of its job-related
human capital.
22 This is the number that is often quoted in press accounts although it is unclear where the reporters get
their figures.
23 Among the reasons why this is unrealistic is the fact that some of these women are young and
attending school, many would prefer to stay home with small children even if child care is available
and many have household duties including caring for elderly relatives that take up much of their
available time.
24 We exclude women younger than 25 as many of them are still in school.  Women over 64 are more
likely to wish to work part-time regardless of impediments to working full-time.19
ii- Increasing the labor force participation rate of women
Again, we use the US as a benchmark to estimate the extent to which Japanese labor market
institutions affect female labor market input.  We assume that Japan is able, by removing
impediments to female labor supply to raise the labor force participation rate of women from
its level of 67% to the US level of 77%.  In this case, there is an increase of about 15% in the
female labor force input.
Adding effects i and ii together (and compounding), we arrive at a total increase in the labor
input of women of 26.5% that would result if the Japanese women had participation and part-
time employment rates comparable to that of the US.  In terms of the overall labor force this
represents an increase of .265 x .41 or around 11%.
25
6.  Overall Implications for Economic Growth
Table 5 below summarizes the results of the calculations given so far.  The results are clearly
not intended to be accurate estimates, but rather to give us some idea of how much of an
impediment to economic growth the factors that we have mentioned so far might contribute.
According to our calculations, the overall effect of eliminating the problems that we have
detailed could raise output by between 9 and 12 percent.  This is approximately equal to a 1%
increase in the potential growth rate of the economy over a ten-year period.  This is, of
course, only a one-time benefit that the Japanese economy could exploit, but it is hardly a
negligible one.
TABLE 5  How Much Could Output Increase with Improvements
in the Functioning of the Labor Market? (%)
Problem Labor Input Output
2
Excess labor held by firms 0.3-5 0.2-3.5
Mismatch unemployment 1.5 1.1
Women’s hours reductions 4.1 2.9
Women’s labor force participation 6.2 4.3
Total
3 12.8-17.5 9.0-12.2
1For the women’s inputs, the levels are computed after multiplying the figures in the text by the
proportion of women in the labor force = .41.
2The effect on economic output = increase in labor x labor’s share (.7)
3The effect of the two contributions concerned with women are compounded in calculating the total.
7.  Conclusions
This paper has examined a number of personnel practices, laws and regulations that lower the
supply of labor in the Japanese economy.  Broadly speaking, there are two kinds of
impediments, those that restrict the movement of labor between firms, and those that
discourage women from participating to a greater extent.  Using other OECD countries and
especially the United States as a benchmark, we estimate that removal of these barriers would
increase the productive labor supply in Japan by some 13 to 18 percent and thus could raise
the potential growth rate of the Japanese economy by roughly 1% per annum over a ten-year
period.
We would like to end the paper with a note of caution.  While the changes that would be
required to overcome some of the barriers such as the poor provision of information in the
                                                
25 This figure might be slightly smaller if the growth in the women’s labor input was adjusted for being
of lower quality than male labor input.20
labor market are already being promoted by government and business leaders, many of the
other changes will require broader changes in the Japanese economy.  As Noguchi (1995) has
pointed out, Japanese economic policy is still based to a large extent on the premise that much
of the security and welfare of individuals in the economy will be provided through their
employers.  Japanese labor law (as developed through case law), industrial policy, and
financial regulation has been based on this assumption.  Policy makers and regulators in areas
other than labor will need to change their approach for the full benefits of any change in labor
regulations to be realized.  The large-scale restructuring that is required if Japan is to continue
to shift away from manufacturing and reduce the size of its construction industry will also
require a shift towards increasing provision of security through private or state-provided
insurance.  This in turn may well have the effect of introducing a different set of
inefficiencies, including an increased rate of unemployment and earlier retirement.  Policies
will need to be designed carefully if this kind of outcome is to be avoided.21
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